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Abstract
We define λseal, an untyped call-by-value λ-calculus with primitives for protecting abstract data by sealing, and develop a
bisimulation proof method that is sound and complete with respect to contextual equivalence. This provides a formal basis for
reasoning about data abstraction in open, dynamic settings where static techniques such as type abstraction and logical relations
are not applicable.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Dynamic sealing: Birth, death, and rebirth
Sealing is a linguistic mechanism for protecting abstract data. As originally proposed by Morris [20,21], it consists
of three constructs: seal creation, sealing, and unsealing. A fresh seal is created for each module that defines abstract
data. Data is sealed when it is passed out of the module, so that it cannot be inspected or modified by outsiders who
do not know the seal; the data is unsealed again when it comes back into the module, so that it can be manipulated
concretely. Data abstraction is preserved as long as the seal is kept local to the module.
Originally, sealing was a dynamic mechanism. Morris also proposed a static variant [21], in which the creation
and use of seals at module boundaries follow a restricted pattern that can be verified by the compiler, removing the
need for run-time sealing and unsealing. Other researchers found that a similar effect could be obtained by enriching
a static type system with mechanisms for type abstraction (see CLU [14], for example). Type abstraction became the
primary method for achieving data abstraction in languages from CLU to the present day. It is also well understood
via the theory of existential types [18].
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Recently, however, as programming languages and the environments in which they operate become more and more
open – e.g., addressing issues of persistence and distribution – dynamic sealing is being rediscovered. For example,
Rossberg [28] proposes to use a form of dynamic sealing to allow type abstraction to coexist with dynamic typing;
Leifer et al. [12] use hashes of implementations of abstract types to protect abstractions among different programs
running on different sites; Dreyer et al. [7] use a variant of sealing (somewhere between static and dynamic) to give a
type-theoretic account of ML-like modules and functors; finally, we [23] have proposed a translation (conjectured to
be fully abstract) of System-F-style type abstraction into dynamic sealing.
Another reason for the renewal of interest in sealing is that it happens to coincide with perfect encryption (under
shared-key cryptography), that is, with an ideal encryption scheme where a ciphertext can be decrypted only if the
key under which it was encrypted is known explicitly. Perfect encryption is a common abstraction in current research
on both systems security and programming languages, for example in modeling and reasoning about cryptographic
protocols (e.g., the spi-calculus [3]).
1.2. Problem
Although interest in dynamic sealing is reviving, there remains a significant obstacle to its extensive study: the lack
of sufficiently powerful methods for reasoning about sealing. First, to the best of our knowledge, there has been no
work at all on proof techniques for sealing in untyped sequential languages. There are several versions of bisimulation
for the spi-calculus, but encoding other languages such as the λ-calculus into the spi-calculus raises the question of
what abstraction properties are preserved by the encoding itself. Indeed, standard encodings of the λ-calculus into the
pi -calculus [16] are not fully abstract, i.e., they do not preserve equivalence. Second, even in statically typed settings,
the published techniques for obtaining abstraction properties are in general very weak. For instance, the first two [12,
28] of the works cited above use (variants of) the colored brackets of Zdancewic et al. [8], but only prove (or even
state) abstraction properties for cases where abstract data is published by itself, with no interface functions provided
(i.e., once sealed, data is never unsealed).
1.3. Abstraction as equivalence
We aim to establish a method for proving abstraction of programs using dynamic sealing in an untyped setting. To
this end, let us first consider how to state the property of abstraction in the first place. Take, for example, the following
module implementing complex numbers in an imaginary ML-like language.
module PolarComplex =
abstype t = real * real
let from_re_and_im : real * real -> t =
fun (x, y) ->
(sqrt(x * x + y * y), atan2(y, x))
let to_re_and_im : t -> real * real =
fun (r, t) ->
(r * cos(t), r * sin(t))
let multiply : t * t -> t =
fun ((r1, t1), (r2, t2)) ->
(r1 * r2, t1 + t2)
end
Using dynamic sealing instead of type abstraction, this module can be written as follows for some secret seal k.
module PolarComplex =
let from_re_and_im =
fun (x, y) ->
let z = (sqrt(x * x + y * y), atan2(y, x)) in
<seal z under k>
let to_re_and_im =
fun z ->
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let (r, t) = <unseal z under k> in
(r * cos(t), r * sin(t))
let multiply =
fun (z1, z2) ->
let (r1, t1) = <unseal z1 under k> in
let (r2, t2) = <unseal z2 under k> in
let z = (r1 * r2, t1 + t2) in
<seal z under k>
end
Now, the question is: is this use of sealing correct? That is, does it really protect data abstraction? In particular, can
we show that this module has the same external behavior as another sealed module that also implements complex
numbers, e.g., the following module with another secret seal k’?
module CartesianComplex =
let from_re_and_im =
fun (x, y) ->
<check that x and y are real numbers>;
let z = (x, y) in <seal z under k’>
let to_re_and_im =
fun z ->
let (x, y) = <unseal z under k’> in (x, y)
let multiply =
fun (z1, z2) ->
let (x1, y1) = <unseal z1 under k’> in
let (x2, y2) = <unseal z2 under k’> in
let z = (x1 * x2 - y1 * y2,
x1 * y2 + x2 * y2) in
<seal z under k’>
end
Formally, we want to show the contextual equivalence [19] of the two modules PolarComplex and
CartesianComplex. In general, however, it is difficult to directly prove contextual equivalence, because it demands
that we consider an infinite number of contexts.
1.4. Equivalence by bisimulation
To overcome this difficulty, we define a notion of bisimulation for our language (by extending applicative
bisimulation [4]), and use it as a tool for proving contextual equivalence. Essentially, a bisimulation records
a set of pairs of “corresponding values” of two different programs. In the example of PolarComplex and
CartesianComplex, the bisimulation is (roughly):
{(PolarComplex, CartesianComplex)}
∪ {(PolarComplex.from_re_and_im, CartesianComplex.from_re_and_im),
(PolarComplex.to_re_and_im, CartesianComplex.to_re_and_im),
(PolarComplex.multiply, CartesianComplex.multiply)}
∪ {((x, y), (x, y)) | x, y real numbers}
∪ {({(r, θ)}k, {(r cos θ, r sin θ)}k′) | r ≥ 0}
The first part is the modules themselves. The second part is the individual elements of the modules. The third is
arguments of from_re_and_im as well as results of to_re_and_im. The last is the representations of complex
numbers sealed under k or k′, where { } denotes sealing.
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From the soundness of bisimulation, we obtain the contextual equivalence of the two modules. Furthermore, our
bisimulation is complete: if two programs are contextually equivalent, then there always exists a bisimulation between
them. This means that (at least in theory) we can use bisimulation to prove any valid contextual equivalence.
1.5. Contribution
The main contribution of this work is a sound and complete bisimulation proof method for contextual equivalence
in an untyped functional language with dynamic sealing. Along the way, we are led to refine the usual contextual
equivalence to account for the variations in observing power induced by the context’s knowledge (or ignorance) of the
seals used in observed terms.
Parts of our theory are analogous to bisimulation techniques developed for the spi-calculus [1,2,5,6]. However, our
bisimulation is technically simpler and thus more suitable for reasoning about dynamic sealing for data abstraction in
sequential languages. Furthermore, our setting requires us to extend even the definition of contextual equivalence in a
natural but significant way, as discussed in Section 3.
1.6. Structure of the paper
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 formalizes the syntax and the semantics of our language,
λseal. Section 3 defines a suitable notion of contextual equivalence. Section 4 presents our bisimulation and gives
several examples, including the complex number packages discussed above and an encoding of the Needham–
Schroeder–Lowe key exchange protocol. Section 5 proves the soundness and completeness of the bisimulation with
respect to contextual equivalence. Section 7 discusses related work, and Section 8 sketches future work.
1.7. Notation
Throughout the paper, we use overbars as shorthand for sequences—e.g., we write x and (v, v′) instead of
x1, . . . , xn and (v1, v′1), . . . , (vn, v′n) where n ≥ 0. Thus, k ∈ s stands for k1, . . . , kn ∈ s and (v, v′) ∈ R for
(v1, v
′
1), . . . , (vn, v
′
n) ∈ R. Similarly, {k} is a shorthand for the set {k1, . . . , kn} where ki 6= k j for any i 6= j . When s
and t are sets, s unionmulti t is defined to be s ∪ t if s ∩ t = ∅, and undefined otherwise.
2. Syntax and semantics
λseal is the standard untyped, call-by-value λ-calculus, extended with sealing. Its syntax is given in Fig. 1. Seal
k is an element of the countably infinite set K of all seals. We use meta-variables s and t for finite subsets of K.
Fresh seal generation νx . e generates a fresh seal k, binds it to x , and evaluates e. The meaning of freshness will
soon be clarified below. Sealing {e1}e2 evaluates e1 to value v, and e2 to seal k, and seals v under k. Unsealing
let {x}e1 = e2 in e3 else e4 evaluates e1 to seal k1, and e2 to sealed value {v}k2 . If k1 = k2, the unsealing succeeds
and e3 is evaluated with x bound to v. Otherwise, the unsealing fails and e4 is evaluated.
The calculus is also parametrized by first-order constants and primitives (involving no seals), such as real
numbers and their arithmetics. We use infix notations for binary primitives like e1 + e2. We assume that constants
include booleans true and false. We also assume that op includes the equality = for constants. Note that we
do not have equality for sealed values yet (cf. Section 6), though equality for seals is easy to implement as in
let {x}k1 = {c}k2 in true else false.
We adopt the standard notion of variable binding and write FV(e) for the set of free variables in e. We also write
Seals(e) for the set of seals that appear in term e.
We write let x = e1 in e2 for (λx . e2)e1. We also write ⊥ for (λx . xx)(λx . xx) and λ{x}k . e for λy. let {x}k =
y in e else ⊥ where y 6∈ FV(e). Furthermore, we write λ〈x, y〉. e for λz. let x = #1(z) in let y = #2(z) in e
where z 6∈ FV(e). We use similar notations of pattern matching throughout the paper.
The semantics of λseal is given in Fig. 2 by big-step evaluation (s) e ⇓ (t) v annotated with the set s of seals before
the evaluation, and with the set t of seals after the evaluation. It is parametrized by the meaning [[op(c1, . . . , cn)]] of
primitives. For example, [[1.23 + 4.56]] = 5.79. For simplicity, we adopt the left-to-right evaluation order. As usual,
substitutions [e/x] avoid capturing free variables by implicit α-conversion. The meaning of freshness is formalized
by requiring k 6∈ s in (E-New). We write (s) e ⇓ if (s) e ⇓ (t) v for some t and v.
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d, e ::= term
x variable
λx . e function
e1 e2 application
c constant
op(e1, . . . , en) primitive
if e1 then e2 else e3 conditional branch
〈e1, . . . , en〉 tupling
#i (e) projection
k seal
νx . e fresh seal generation
{e1}e2 sealing
let {x}e1 = e2 in e3 else e4 unsealing
u, v, w ::= value
λx . e function
c constant
〈v1, . . . , vn〉 tuple
k seal
{v}k sealed value
Fig. 1. Syntax of λseal.
Because of fresh seal generation, our evaluation is not quite deterministic. For instance, we have both (∅) νx .
x ⇓ ({k1}) k1 and (∅) νx . x ⇓ ({k2}) k2 for k1 6= k2. Nevertheless, we have the following property:
Property 2.1. Evaluation is deterministic modulo the names of freshly generated seals. That is, for any (s) e ⇓ (t) v
and (s) e ⇓ (t ′) v′ with Seals(e) ⊆ s, we have v = [k/x]e0 and v′ = [k′/x]e0 for some e0 with Seals(e0) ⊆ s, some k
with {k} ⊆ t \ s, and some k′ with {k′} ⊆ t ′ \ s.
Proof. Straightforward induction on the derivation of (s) e ⇓ (t) v. 
In what follows, we implicitly use the following properties of evaluation without explicitly referring to them.
Property 2.2. Every value evaluates only to itself. That is, for any s and v with s ⊇ Seals(v), we have (s) v ⇓ (s) v.
Furthermore, if (s) v ⇓ (t) w, then t = s and w = v.
Proof. Straightforward induction on the syntax of values. 
Property 2.3. Evaluation never decreases the seal set. That is, for any (s) e ⇓ (t) v, we have s ⊆ t .
Proof. Straightforward induction on the derivation of (s) e ⇓ (t) v. 
3. Generalized contextual equivalence
In the standard untyped λ-calculus, contextual equivalence for closed values1 can be defined by saying that v and
v′ are contextually equivalent if [v/x]e ⇓ ⇐⇒ [v′/x]e ⇓ for any term e. In λseal, however, contextual equivalence
cannot be defined for two values in isolation. For instance, consider λ{x}k . x + 1 and λ{x}k′ . x + 2. Whether these
values are equivalent or not depends on what values sealed under k or k′ are known to the context. If the original terms
which created k and k′ were νz. 〈{2}z, λ{x}z . x + 1〉 and νz. 〈{1}z, λ{x}z . x + 2〉, for example, then the only values
sealed under k or k′ are 2 and 1, respectively. Thus, the equivalence above does hold. On the other hand, it does not
hold if the terms are, say, νz. 〈{3}z, λ{x}z . x+1〉 and νz. 〈{4}z, λ{x}z . x+2〉. This observation that we have to consider
multiple pairs of values at once leads to the following definition of contextual equivalence.
1 For the sake of simplicity, we focus on the equivalence of closed values (as opposed to open expressions) in this paper. For open expressions
e and e′ with free variables x1, . . . , xn , it suffices to consider the equivalence of λx1. . . . λxn . e and λx1. . . . λxn . e′ instead. See also our recent
work [33, Section 6] for more formal discussion on this issue.
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Seals(e) ⊆ s
(s) λx . e ⇓ (s) λx . e (E-Lam)
(s) e1 ⇓ (s1) λx . e (s1) e2 ⇓ (s2) v (s2) [v/x]e ⇓ (t) w
(s) e1 e2 ⇓ (t) w (E-App)
(s) c ⇓ (s) c (E-Const)
(s) e1 ⇓ (s1) c1 . . . (sn−1) en ⇓ (sn) cn [[op(c1, . . . , cn)]] = c
(s) op(e1, . . . , en) ⇓ (sn) c (E-Prim)
(s) e1 ⇓ (s1) true (s1) e2 ⇓ (t) v
(s) if e1 then e2 else e3 ⇓ (t) v (E-Cond-True)
(s) e1 ⇓ (s1) false (s1) e3 ⇓ (t) v
(s) if e1 then e2 else e3 ⇓ (t) v (E-Cond-False)
(s) e1 ⇓ (s1) v1 . . . (sn−1) en ⇓ (sn) vn
(s) 〈e1, . . . , en〉 ⇓ (sn) 〈v1, . . . , vn〉 (E-Tuple)
(s) e ⇓ (t) 〈v1, . . . , vn〉 1 ≤ i ≤ n
(s) #i (e) ⇓ (t) vi (E-Proj)
k ∈ s
(s) k ⇓ (s) k (E-Seal)
(s unionmulti {k}) [k/x]e ⇓ (t) v
(s) νx . e ⇓ (t) v (E-New)
(s) e1 ⇓ (s1) v (s1) e2 ⇓ (s2) k
(s) {e1}e2 ⇓ (s2) {v}k
(E-Do-Seal)
(s) e1 ⇓ (s1) k (s1) e2 ⇓ (s2) {v}k (s2) [v/x]e3 ⇓ (t) w
(s) let {x}e1 = e2 in e3 else e4 ⇓ (t) w
(E-Unseal-Succ)
(s) e1 ⇓ (s1) k1 (s1) e2 ⇓ (s2) {v}k2 k1 6= k2 (s2) e4 ⇓ (t) w
(s) let {x}e1 = e2 in e3 else e4 ⇓ (t) w
(E-Unseal-Fail)
Fig. 2. Semantics of λseal.
Definition 3.1. A value relationR is a set of pairs of values.
Definition 3.2. The contextual equivalence ≡ is the set of all triples (s, s′,R) such that for any (v, v′) ∈ R, we have
the following properties.
1. Seals(v) ⊆ s and Seals(v′) ⊆ s′.
2. (s) [v/x]e ⇓ ⇐⇒ (s′) [v′/x]e ⇓ for any e with Seals(e) = ∅.
The intuition is that v and v′ are indistinguishable for any observer within the language (unless it somehow knows
any of the seals in s or s′ a priori). We write (s) v1, . . . , vn ≡ (s′) v′1, . . . , v′n for (s, s′, {(v1, v′1), . . . , (vn, v′n)}) ∈ ≡.
In order to lighten the notation, we do not enclose these v1, . . . , vn and v′1, . . . , v′n in parentheses. We also write (s)
v ≡R (s′) v′ when (v, v′) ∈ R and (s, s′,R) ∈ ≡. Intuitively, it can be read as “value v with seal set s and value v′
with seal set s′ are contextually equivalent under contexts’ knowledgeR”.
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Note that no generality is lost by requiring Seals(e) = ∅ in the definition above: if e needs its own seals, it can
freshly generate an arbitrary number of them by using ν; if e knows some k ∈ s in the left-hand side and corresponding
k
′ ∈ s′ in the right-hand side of contextual equivalence, it suffices to require (k, k′) ∈ R so that these seals can be
substituted for some free x in e by Condition 2 above. Thus, our contextual equivalence subsumes standard contextual
equivalence where a context knows none, all, or part of the seals (or, more generally, values involving the seals).
Conversely, the standard contextual equivalence (for closed values) is implied by the generalized one in the following
sense: if (v, v′) ∈ R for some (s, s′,R) ∈ ≡, then it is immediate by definition that K [v] ⇓ ⇐⇒ K [v′] ⇓ for any
context K with a hole [ ].
Example 3.3. Let s = {k} and s′ = {k′}. We have (s) {2}k ≡ (s′) {1}k′ since the context has no means to unseal the
values sealed under k or k′. (A formal proof of this claim based on bisimulation will be given later in Example 4.2
with Corollary 5.7.) We also have (s) λ{x}k . x + 1 ≡ (s′) λ{x}k′ . x + 2 since the context cannot make up any values
sealed under k or k′.
Furthermore, we have
(s) {2}k, λ{x}k . x + 1 ≡ (s′) {1}k′ , λ{x}k′ . x + 2
because applications of the functions to the sealed values yield the same integer 3. Similarly,
(s) {4}k, λ{x}k . x + 1 ≡ (s′) {5}k′ , λ{x}k′ . x
holds. However,
(s) {2}k, λ{x}k . x + 1, {4}k, λ{x}k . x + 1
≡ (s′) {1}k′ , λ{x}k′ . x + 2, {5}k′ , λ{x}k′ . x
does not hold, because applications of the last functions to the first sealed values yield different integers 3 and 1.
As the last example shows, even if (s, s′,R1) ∈ ≡ and (s, s′,R2) ∈ ≡, we do not always have (s, s′,R1 ∪ R2)
∈ ≡. Intuitively, this means that we should not confuse two worlds where the uses of seals are different. This is the
reason why we defined ≡ as a set of triples (s, s′,R) rather than just a function that takes a pair (s, s′) of seal sets and
returns the setR of all pairs of equivalent values.
Conversely, again as the examples above suggest, there are cases where (s, s′,R1) ∈ ≡ and (s, s′,R2) ∈ ≡ for
R1 ⊆ R2. This implies that there is a partial order among the value relations R in contextual equivalence. We could
alternatively define contextual equivalence only with such value relations that are maximal in this ordering, but this
would just complicate the technicalities that follow.
We will use the following lemmas about contextual equivalence in what follows.
Lemma 3.4. Application, projection, fresh seal generation, and unsealing all preserve contextual equivalence. That
is:
1. For any (u, u′) ∈ R and (v, v′) ∈ R with (s, s′,R) ∈ ≡, if (s) uv ⇓ (t) w and (s) u′v′ ⇓ (t ′) w′, then
(t, t ′,R ∪ {(w,w′)}) ∈ ≡.
2. For any (〈v1, . . . , vn〉, 〈v′1, . . . , v′n〉) ∈ R with (s, s′,R) ∈ ≡, we have (s, s′,R ∪ {(vi , v′i )}) ∈ ≡ for any
1 ≤ i ≤ n.
3. For any (s, s′,R) ∈ ≡, we have (s unionmulti {k}, s′ unionmulti {k′},R unionmulti {(k, k′)}) ∈ ≡ for any k 6∈ s and k′ 6∈ s′.
4. For any ({v}k, {v′}k′) ∈ R and (k, k′) ∈ R with (s, s′,R) ∈ ≡, we have (s, s′,R ∪ {(v, v′)}) ∈ ≡.
Proof. To prove the case of application, let us assume (u, u′) ∈ R and (v, v′) ∈ R with (s, s′,R) ∈ ≡ as well
as (s) uv ⇓ (t) w and (s) u′v′ ⇓ (t ′) w′, and prove (t, t ′,R ∪ {(w,w′)}) ∈ ≡. The first condition of contextual
equivalence in Definition 3.2 follows immediately from (part of) Property 2.1. To show the second, take any
(w,w′) ∈ R ∪ {(w,w′)}, take any e with Seals(e) = ∅, and prove (t) [w/x]e ⇓ ⇐⇒ (t ′) [w′/x]e ⇓. Without loss
of generality, let u1 = u and u′1 = u′. Then, from the second condition in the definition of (s, s′,R) ∈ ≡, we have
(s) [u, v, w2, . . . , wn/y, z, x2, . . . , xn](let x1 = yz in e) ⇓
⇐⇒ (s′) [u′, v′, w′2, . . . , w′n/y, z, x2, . . . , xn](let x1 = yz in e) ⇓
from which the conclusion follows with the assumptions (s) uv ⇓ (t) w and (s) u′v′ ⇓ (t ′) w′.
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The other cases follow similarly by taking let x1 = #i (y) in e or νx1. e or let {x1}y = z in e, respectively,
instead of let x1 = yz in e above. 
Lemma 3.5. Contextually equivalent values put in the same value context yield contextually equivalent values. That
is, for any (s, s′,R) ∈ ≡ and (v, v′) ∈ R, and for any w = [v/x]e0 and w′ = [v′/x]e0 with Seals(e0) = ∅, we have
(s, s′,R ∪ {(w,w′)}) ∈ ≡.
Proof. Immediate from the definition of contextual equivalence, using the property of substitution that
[[v/x]e0/x]e = [v/x]([e0/x]e) when {x} ∩ FV(e) = ∅. 
Lemma 3.6. Any elements of a subset of contextually equivalent values are contextually equivalent. That is, for any
(s, s′,R) ∈ ≡, we have (s, s′,S) ∈ ≡ for any S ⊆ R.
Proof. Immediate from the definition of contextual equivalence. 
4. Bisimulation
Giving a direct proof of contextual equivalence is generally difficult, because the definition involves universal
quantification over an infinite number of contexts. Thus, we want a more convenient tool for proving contextual
equivalence. For this purpose, we define the notion of bisimulation as follows.
Definition 4.1. A bisimulation is a set X of triples (s, s′,R) such that:
1. For each (v, v′) ∈ R, we have Seals(v) ⊆ s and Seals(v′) ⊆ s′.
2. For each (v, v′) ∈ R, v and v′ are of the same kind. That is, both are functions, both are constants, both are tuples,
both are seals, or both are sealed values.
3. For each (c, c′) ∈ R, we have c = c′.
4. For each (〈v1, . . . , vn〉, 〈v′1, . . . , v′n′〉) ∈ R, we have n = n′ and (s, s′,R ∪ {(vi , v′i )}) ∈ X for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
5. For each (k1, k′1) ∈ R and (k2, k′2) ∈ R, we have k1 = k2 ⇐⇒ k′1 = k′2.
6. For each ({v}k, {v′}k′) ∈ R, we have either (k, k′) ∈ R and (s, s′,R ∪ {(v, v′)}) ∈ X , or else k 6∈ fst(R) and
k′ 6∈ snd(R). Here, fst(R) is the set of the first elements of all pairs inR and snd(R) the second.
7. Take any (λx . e, λx . e′) ∈ R. Take also any k and k′ with s ∩ {k} = s′ ∩ {k′} = ∅. Moreover, let v = [u/x]d and
v′ = [u′/x]d for any (u, u′) ∈ R unionmulti {(k, k′)} and Seals(d) = ∅. Then, we have (s unionmulti {k}) (λx . e)v ⇓ ⇐⇒
(s′ unionmulti {k′}) (λx . e′)v′ ⇓. Furthermore, if (s unionmulti {k}) (λx . e)v ⇓ (t) w and (s′ unionmulti {k′}) (λx . e′)v′ ⇓ (t ′) w′, then
(t, t ′,R unionmulti {(k, k′)} ∪ {(w,w′)}) ∈ X .
For any bisimulation X , we write (s) v XR (s′) v′ when (v, v′) ∈ R and (s, s′,R) ∈ X . This can be read “values v
and v′ with seal sets s and s′ are bisimilar under contexts’ knowledgeR”.
The intuitions behind the definition of bisimulation are as follows. Each of the conditions excludes pairs of values
that are distinguishable by a context (except for Condition 1, which just restricts the scoping of seals). Condition
2 excludes pairs of values of different kinds, e.g., 123 and λx . x . Condition 3 excludes pairs of different constants.
Condition 4 excludes pairs of tuples with distinguishable elements. Condition 5 excludes cases, such as (k, k′) ∈ R
and (k, k′′) ∈ R with k′ 6= k′′, for which contexts like let {x}y = {()}z in x else ⊥ can distinguish the left-hand
side (setting y = z = k) and the right-hand side (setting y = k′ and z = k′′). Condition 6 excludes cases where (i) the
context can unseal both of two sealed values whose contents are distinguishable, or (ii) the context can unseal only
one of the two sealed values.
Condition 7, the most interesting one, is about what a context can do to distinguish two functions. Obviously,
this will involve applying them to some arguments—but what arguments? Certainly not arbitrary terms, because in
general a context has only a partial knowledge of (values involving) the seals in s and s′. All that a context can do for
making up the arguments is to carry out some computation d using values u and u′ from its knowledge. Therefore, the
arguments have forms [u/x]d and [u′/x]d .
An important and perhaps surprising point here is that it actually suffices to consider cases where these arguments
are values. This restriction is useful and even crucial for proving the bisimulation of functions: if the arguments [u/x]d
and [u′/x]d were not values, we should evaluate them before applying the functions; in particular, if the evaluation
of one argument converges, then the evaluation of the other argument must converge as well; proving this property
amounts to proving the contextual equivalence of u and u′, which was the whole purpose of our bisimulation!
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Fortunately, our restriction of the arguments to values can be justified by the “fundamental property” proved in
the next section, which says that the special forms [u/x]d and [u′/x]d are preserved by evaluation. The only change
required as a result of this restriction is the addition of {(k, k′)} to knowledge R in Condition 7: it compensates for
the fact that d can no longer be a fresh seal generation, while the context can still generate its own fresh seals k and k
′
when making up the arguments. Without such a change, our bisimulation would indeed be unsound: a counter-example
would be (∅,∅, {(λx . {true}x , λx . {false}x )}), which would satisfy all the conditions of bisimulation (including
Condition 7, in particular, because the arguments v and v′ could not contain any seal), while contexts like νy.
let {z}y = [ ] y in if z then () else ⊥ can distinguish the two functions.
The rest of Condition 7 is straightforward: the results w and w′ of function application should also be bisimilar.
Example 4.2. Let s = {k}, s′ = {k′}, andR = {({2}k, {1}k′)}. Then {(s, s′,R)} is a bisimulation, as can be seen by a
straightforward check of the conditions above.
Example 4.3. Let s = {k1, k2}, s′ = {k′}, and
R = {(〈{2}k1 , {4}k2〉,〈{1}k′ , {5}k′〉),
({2}k1 , {1}k′),
({4}k2 , {5}k′)}.
Then {(s, s′,R)} is a bisimulation. This example illustrates the fact that the number of seals may differ on the left-
hand side and on the right-hand side of the bisimulation. Note that the closure condition (Condition 4) in the definition
of bisimulation demands that we include not only the original pairs, but also their corresponding components.
Example 4.4. Suppose we want to show that the pair 〈{2}k, λ{x}k . x + 1〉 is bisimilar to 〈{1}k′ , λ{x}k′ . x + 2)〉,
assuming that seals k and k′ are not known to the context. Again, the closure conditions in the definition force us
to include the corresponding components of the pairs (Condition 4), as well as the results of evaluating the second
components applied to the first components (Condition 7); moreover, since Condition 7 allows the context to enrich
the set of seals with arbitrary seals of its own, our bisimulation will consist of an infinite collection of similar sets,
differing in the context’s choice of seals.
Formally, let G be the following function on sets of pairs of seals:
G{(k0, k′0)} = {(〈{2}k, λ{x}k . x + 1〉,
〈{1}k′ , λ{x}k′ . x + 2〉),
({2}k, {1}k′),
(λ{x}k . x + 1, λ{x}k′ . x + 2),
(3, 3)}
∪ {(k0, k′0)}
Then
X = {({k, k0}, {k′, k′0}, G{(k0, k′0)}) | k 6∈ {k0} ∧ k′ 6∈ {k′0}}
is a bisimulation. The only non-trivial work required to show this is checking Condition 7 for the pair (λ{x}k .
x + 1, λ{x}k′ . x + 2) ∈ G{(k0, k′0)}, for each k0 and k′0 with k 6∈ {k0} and k′ 6∈ {k′0}.
Consider any v = [u/x]d and v′ = [u′/x]d with (u, u′) ∈ G{(k0, k′0)}unionmulti {(k1, k′1)} and Seals(d) = {k, k0}∩ {k1} =
{k′, k′0} ∩ {k′1} = ∅. If the evaluations of (λ{x}k . x + 1)v and (λ{x}k′ . x + 2)v′ diverge, then the condition holds.
Let us focus on cases where the evaluation of (λ{x}k . x + 1)v converges (without loss of generality, thanks to
symmetry), that is, where v is of the form {w}k . Then, either d is of the form {d0}xi and ui = k, or else d is a variable
xi and ui = {w}k . However, the former case is impossible: k is not in the first projection of G{(k0, k′0)} or {(k1, k′1)}
by their definitions. So we must be in the latter case.
Since the only element of the form {w}k in the first projection of G{(k0, k′0)} unionmulti {(k1, k′1)} is {2}k where the
corresponding element in its second projection is {1}k′ , we have v = {2}k and v′ = {1}k′ . Then, the only evaluations
of (λ{x}k . x + 1)v and (λ{x}k′ . x + 2)v′ are
({k, k0} unionmulti {k1}) (λ{x}k . x + 1)v ⇓ ({k, k0, k1}) 3
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and
({k′, k′0} unionmulti {k′1}) (λ{x}k′ . x + 2)v′ ⇓ ({k′, k′0, k′1}) 3.
Thus, the condition follows from
G{(k0, k′0)} unionmulti {(k1, k′1)} ∪ {(3, 3)} = G{(k0, k′0), (k1, k′1)}
and
({k, k0, k1}, {k′, k′0, k′1},G{(k0, k′0), (k1, k′1)}) ∈ X.
Example 4.5 (Complex Numbers). Now let us show a bisimulation relating the two implementations of complex
numbers in Section 1.3. First, let
v = 〈λ〈x, y〉. {〈x + 0.0, y + 0.0〉}k,
λ{〈x, y〉}k . 〈x, y〉,
λ〈{〈x1, y1〉}k, {〈x2, y2〉}k〉.
{〈x1 × x2 − y1 × y2, x1 × y2 + y1 × x2〉}k〉
v′ = 〈λ〈x, y〉. {〈sqrt〈x × x + y × y〉, atan2〈y, x〉〉}k′ ,
λ{〈r, θ〉}k′ . 〈r × cos θ, r × sin θ〉,
λ〈{〈r1, θ1〉}k′ , {〈r2, θ2〉}k′〉. {〈r1 × r2, θ1 + θ2〉}k′〉.
The first component of each triple corresponds to the from_re_and_im functions in 1.3. The implementation in v just
seals the x and y coordinates provided as arguments, after checking that they are indeed real numbers by attempting
to add them to 0.0. The implementation in v′ performs an appropriate change of representation before sealing. The
second components correspond to the to_re_and_im functions in 1.3, and the third components to the multiply
functions.
The construction of the bisimulation follows the same pattern as Example 4.4, except that the operator G is more
interesting:
G{(k0, k′0)} =
{(v, v′)}
∪ {(λ〈x, y〉. {〈x + 0.0, y + 0.0〉}k,
λ〈x, y〉. {〈sqrt(x × x + y × y), atan2(y, x)〉}k′),
(λ{〈x, y〉}k . 〈x, y〉,
λ{〈r, θ〉}k′ . 〈r × cos θ, r × sin θ〉),
(λ〈{〈x1, y1〉}k, {〈x2, y2〉}k〉.
{〈x1 × x2 − y1 × y2, x1 × y2 + y1 × x2〉}k,
λ〈{〈r1, θ1〉}k′ , {〈r2, θ2〉}k′〉. {〈r1 × r2, θ1 + θ2〉}k′)}
∪ {(〈x, y〉, 〈x, y〉) | x and y are arbitrary real numbers}
∪ {({〈r cos θ, r sin θ〉}k, {〈r, θ〉}k′) | r ≥ 0}
∪ {(k0, k′0)}
Example 4.6 (Generative vs. Non-Generative Functors). In this example, we use bisimulation to show the
equivalence of two instantiations of a generative functor, where generativity is modeled by fresh seal generation
and the equivalence really depends on the generativity.
A functor is a parameterized module—a function from modules to modules. For example, a module implementing
sets by binary trees can be parameterized by the type of elements and their comparison function. In the same imaginary
ML-like language as in Section 1.3, such a functor might be written as follows:
functor Set(module Element : sig
type t
val less_than : t -> t -> bool
end) =
type elt = Element.t
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abstype set = Element.t tree
let empty : set = Leaf
let rec add : elt -> set -> set =
fun x ->
fun Leaf -> Node(x, Leaf, Leaf)
| Node(y, l, r) ->
if Element.less_than x y then
Node(y, add x l, r)
else if Element.less_than y x then
Node(y, l, add x r)
else Node(y, l, r)
let rec is_elt_of : elt -> set -> bool =
fun x ->
fun Leaf -> false
| Node(y, l, r) ->
if Element.less_than x y then
is_elt_of x l
else if Element.less_than y x then
is_elt_of x r
else true
end
Now, consider the following three applications of this functor:
module IntSet1 =
Set(module Element =
type t = int
let less_than : t -> t -> bool =
fun x -> fun y -> (x <int y)
end)
module IntSet2 =
Set(module Element =
type t = int
let less_than : t -> t -> bool =
fun x -> fun y -> (x <int y)
end)
module IntSet3 =
Set(module Element =
type t = int
let less_than : t -> t -> bool =
fun x -> fun y -> (x >int y)
end)
If the functor Set is non-generative,2 the abstract type IntSet3.set becomes compatible with IntSet1.set and
IntSet2.set, even though the comparison function of IntSet3 is not compatible with that of IntSet1 or IntSet2.
As a result, (part of) their abstraction as sets of integers is lost: for instance, IntSet2 and IntSet3 are distinguished
by a context like
C[ ] = let s = [ ].add 7 ([ ].add 3 [ ].empty) in
IntSet1.is_elt_of 7 s
while they should be equivalent if considered just as two different implementations of integer sets.
2 We intentionally avoid calling it “applicative” since the original design [13] of applicative functors carefully prevents the problem which
follows here.
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This situation can be translated into λseal as follows. First, the non-generative functor can be implemented by the
following function f , using a standard call-by-value fixed-point operator fix (which is definable since the language
is untyped).
λlt.
〈{nil}k,
fix(λadd. λ〈x, {y}k〉.
if lt〈x, x〉 then ⊥ else (* check that x has type elt *)
if y = nil then {〈x, nil, nil〉}k else
if lt〈x, #1(y)〉 then {〈#1(y), add(x, #2(y)), #3(y)〉}k else
if lt〈#1(y), x〉 then {〈#1(y), #2(y), add(x, #3(y))〉}k else
{y}k),
fix(λis elt of. λ〈x, {y}k〉.
if y = nil then false else
if lt〈x, #1(y)〉 then is elt of〈x, #2(y)〉 else
if lt〈#1(y), x〉 then is elt of〈x, #3(y)〉 else
true)〉
Next, we translate the three applications of the functor into three applications of f to appropriate comparison
functions:
({k}) f (λ〈x, y〉. x <int y) ⇓ ({k}) v1
({k}) f (λ〈x, y〉. x <int y) ⇓ ({k}) v2
({k}) f (λ〈x, y〉. x >int y) ⇓ ({k}) v3
The values v2 and v3 are not contextually equivalent when the context knows v1. That is, ({k}, {k}, {(v1, v1), (v2, v3)})
6∈ ≡. To see this, take e = #3(x) 〈7, #2(y) 〈7, #2(y) 〈3, #1(y)〉〉〉, setting x = v1, y = v2 in the left hand side and
x = v1, y = v3 in the right hand side.
Note that v2 and v3 are contextually equivalent if the context knows neither v1, f , nor any other values involving
the seal k. That is, ({k}, {k}, {(v2, v3)}) ∈ ≡. Indeed, the context C[ ] above uses IntSet1 to distinguish IntSet2
and IntSet3. Our definition of contextual equivalence as a set of relations (annotated with seal sets) gives a precise
account for such subtle variations of contexts’ knowledge.
On the other hand, if we take the Set functor to be generative, then IntSet2 and IntSet3 are contextually
equivalent even if the context also knows IntSet1, since all the abstract types are incompatible with one another.
This case can be modeled in λseal by the following function g, which generates a fresh seal for each application
instead of using the same seal k for all instantiations.
λlt. νz.
〈{nil}z,
fix(λadd. λ〈x, {y}z〉. . . .),
fix(λis elt of. λ〈x, {y}z〉. . . .)〉
Consider the following three applications of g.
(∅) g(λ〈x, y〉. x <int y) ⇓ ({k1}) w1
({k1}) g(λ〈x, y〉. x <int y) ⇓ ({k1, k2}) w2
({k1}) g(λ〈x, y〉. x >int y) ⇓ ({k1, k3}) w3
Now w2 and w3 are bisimilar even if the context knows w1. That is, there exists a bisimulation X such that
({k1, k2}, {k1, k3},R) ∈ X with {(w1, w1), (w2, w3)} ⊆ R. It is straightforward to construct this bisimulation in
the same manner as Examples 4.4 and 4.5.
Example 4.7. Let us show that λx . 〈3, x〉 is bisimilar to itself. This example is technically trickier than previous ones,
because arbitrary values provided by the context can appear verbatim within results. These results can again be passed
as arguments and thus appear within yet larger results, etc. To achieve the required closure conditions, we need to
reach a limit of this process. This can be accomplished by defining a bisimulation X inductively.
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We require (∅,∅,∅) ∈ X as the (trivial) base case. The induction rule is as follows. Take any (s, s′,R) ∈ X . Take
any w = [v/x]e and w′ = [v′/x]e with (v, v′) ∈ R and Seals(e) = ∅. Take any t ⊇ s and t ′ ⊇ s′ of the forms {k}
and {k′}. Let
S = {(λx . 〈3, x〉, λx . 〈3, x〉),
(〈3, w〉, 〈3, w′〉),
(3, 3),
(w,w′),
(k, k
′
)}.
We then require that (t, t ′, T ) ∈ X for any T ⊆ S. The bisimulation we want is the least X satisfying these conditions.
Intuitively, we have defined X so that the conditions of bisimulation – Condition 7, in particular – are immediately
satisfied. The final technical twist, T ⊆ S, is needed because the closure conditions in the definition of bisimulation
add individual pairs of elements rather than adding their whole “deductive closures” at once.
Example 4.8 (Protocol Encoding). As a final illustration of the power of our bisimulation technique (and λseal
itself), let us consider a more challenging example. This example is an encoding of the protocol below, which is
based on the key exchange protocol of Needham, Schroeder, and Lowe [15,22].
1. B→ A : B
2. A→ B : {NA, A}kB
3. B→ A : {NA, NB, B}kA
4. A→ B : {NB}kB
5. B→ A : {i}NB
In this protocol, A is a server accepting requests from good B and evil E. It is supposed to work as follows. (1) B
sends its own name B to A. (2) A generates a fresh nonce NA, pairs it with its own name A, encrypts the pair with
B’s public key, and sends it to B. (3) B generates a fresh key NB , tuples it with NA and B, encrypts the tuple with
A’s public key, and sends it to A. (4) A encrypts NB with B’s public key and sends it to B. (5) B encrypts some secret
integer i with NB and sends it to A.
The idea of the encoding is as follows. We use sealing, unsealing and fresh seal generation as (perfect) encryption,
decryption, and fresh key generation. The whole system is expressed as a tuple of (functions representing) keys known
to the attacker and terms U and V representing principals B and A.
W = 〈λx . {x}kA , λx . {x}kB , kE ,U, V 〉
Each principal is encoded as a pair of the last value it sent (if any) and a continuation function waiting to receive a next
message. When the message is received, the function returns the next state of the principal. Communication occurs by
a context applying these functions in an appropriate order (when the environment is behaving normally) or perhaps
in some strange, arbitrary order (when the environment is under the control of a malicious attacker). Thus, contexts
play the role of the network, scheduler, and attackers. More details about the encoding – including a more detailed
justification of the claim that it is a reasonable encoding of the protocol above – can be found in previous work [32].
We write assert(e1); e2 as syntactic sugar for if e1 then e2 else ⊥.
U = 〈B, λ{〈x, y〉}kB . assert(y = A);
νz. 〈{〈x, z, B〉}kA ,
λ{z0}kB . assert(z0 = z);
{i}z〉〉
V = λx . let kx = (if x = B then kB else
if x = E then kE else ⊥) in
νy. 〈{(y, A)}kx ,
λ{〈y0, z, x0〉}kA . assert(y0 = y);
assert(x0 = x);
{z}kx 〉
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Now, take any integers i and j . We prove that the system W above (where the secret value sent from B to A is
i) and the system W ′ below (where the secret is j) are bisimilar, which means that the protocol keeps i and j secret
against attackers.
U ′ = 〈B, λ{〈x, y〉}k′B . assert(y = A);
νz. 〈{〈x, z, B〉}k′A ,
λ{z0}k′B . assert(z0 = z);{ j}z〉〉
V ′ = λx . let kx = (if x = B then k′B else
if x = E then k′E else ⊥) in
νy. 〈{(y, A)}kx ,
λ{〈y0, z, x0〉}k′A . assert(y0 = y);
assert(x0 = x);
{z}kx 〉
W ′ = 〈λx . {x}k′A , λx . {x}k′B , k′E ,U ′, V ′〉
The construction of the bisimulation X is by induction, following the same basic pattern as Example 4.7. The base case
is (∅,∅,∅) ∈ X . The induction rule is as follows. Take any (s, s′,R) ∈ X . Take any w = [v/x]e and w′ = [v′/x]e
with (v, v′) ∈ R and Seals(e) = ∅. Take any t ⊇ s and t ′ ⊇ s′ of the forms {kA, kB, kE , kAB, kAE , kB, k} and
{k′A, k′B, k′E , k
′
AB, k
′
AE , k
′
B, k
′}. Then, (t, t ′, T ) ∈ X for any subset T of the set S given in Fig. 3. It is routine to check
the conditions of bisimulation for this X .
It is well known that the secrecy property does not hold for the original version of this protocol (i.e., without Lowe’s
fix), in which the third message is {NA, NB}kA instead of {NA, NB, B}kA (i.e., the B is missing). This flaw is mirrored
in our setting as well: if we tried to construct a bisimulation for this version in the same way as above, it would fail to
be a bisimulation for the following reason. Since we would have
({〈w, kB〉}kA , {〈w′, k′B〉}k′A ) ∈ S
instead of
({〈w, kB, B〉}kA , {〈w′, k′B, B〉}k′A ) ∈ S
along with (kAE , k
′
AE ) ∈ S, we would have ({〈kAE , kB〉}kA , {〈k′AE , k′B〉}k′A ) ∈ S by taking w = kAE and w′ = k
′
AE
in the definition of X above. Since we would have
(λ{〈y0, z〉}kA . assert(y0 = kAE ); {z}kE ,
λ{〈y0, z〉}k′A . assert(y0 = k
′
AE ); {z}k′E ) ∈ S
as well instead of
(λ{〈y0, z, x0〉}kA . assert(y0 = kAE ); assert(x0 = E); {z}kE ,
λ{〈y0, z, x0〉}k′A . assert(y0 = k
′
AE ); assert(x0 = E); {z}k′E ) ∈ S
we should also have ({kB}kE , {k′B}k′E ) ∈ S by applying these functions to the previous ciphertexts, according the
condition of bisimulation for functions (Condition 7). Furthermore, since (kE , k′E ) ∈ S, we would need (kB, k
′
B) ∈ S
as well, according to the condition of bisimulation for sealed values (Condition 6). Then, since ({i}kB , { j}k′B ) ∈ S, we
should require (i, j) ∈ S. This contradicts the condition of bisimulation for constants (Condition 3) if i 6= j . Observe
how the same attack is prevented in the fixed version of this protocol: the assertion assert(x0 = E) fails, since x0 is
bound to B.
5. Soundness and completeness
Bisimilarity, written ∼, is the largest bisimulation. It exists because the union of two bisimulations is always a
bisimulation. We will need several simple lemmas about bisimulations in the development that follows.
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S = {(U,U ′), (V, V ′), (W,W ′),
— corresponding keys and constants known to the attacker
(k, k′), (A, A), (B, B), (E, E),
(λx . {x}kA , λx . {x}k′A ), (λx . {x}kB , λx . {x}k′B ), (kE , k
′
E ),
(w,w′), ({w}kA , {w′}k′A ), ({w}kB , {w
′}k′B ),
— corresponding components from principal B at Step 1
(λ{〈x, y〉}kB . assert(y = A); νz. ({〈x, z, B〉}kA , λ{z0}kB . assert(z0 = z); {i}z),
λ{〈x, y〉}k′B . assert(y = A); νz. ({〈x, z, B〉}k′A , λ{z0}k′B . assert(z0 = z); { j}z)),
— corresponding components from principal A at Step 2, communicating with B
(〈{〈kAB , A〉}kB , λ{〈y0, z, x0〉}kA . assert(y0 = kAB); assert(x0 = B); {z}kB 〉,
〈{〈k′AB , A〉}k′B , λ{〈y0, z, x0〉}k′A . assert(y0 = k
′
AB); assert(x0 = B); {z}k′B 〉),
({〈kAB , A〉}kB , {〈k′AB , A〉}k′B ),
(λ{〈y0, z, x0〉}kA . assert(y0 = kAB); assert(x0 = B); {z}kB ,
λ{〈y0, z, x0〉}k′A . assert(y0 = k
′
AB); assert(x0 = B); {z}k′B ),
— corresponding components from principal B at step 3, communicating with A
(〈{〈kAB , kB , B〉}kA , λ{z0}kB . assert(z0 = kAB); {i}kB 〉,
〈{〈k′AB , k′B , B〉}k′A , λ{z0}k′B . assert(z0 = k
′
AB); { j}k′B 〉),
({〈kAB , kB , B〉}kA , {〈k′AB , k′B , B〉}k′A ),
(λ{z0}kB . assert(z0 = kAB); {i}kB ,
λ{z0}k′B . assert(z0 = k
′
AB); { j}k′B ),
— corresponding components from principal A at step 4, communicating with B
({kB}kB , {k′B}k′B ),
— corresponding components from principal B at step 5, communicating with A
({i}kB , { j}k′B ),
— corresponding components from principal A at Step 2, communicating with E
(〈{〈kAE , A〉}kE , λ{〈y0, z, x0〉}kA . assert(y0 = kAE ); assert(x0 = E); {z}kE 〉,
〈{〈k′AE , A〉}k′E , λ{〈y0, z, x0〉}k′A . assert(y0 = k
′
AE ); assert(x0 = E); {z}k′E 〉),
({〈kAE , A〉}kE , {〈k′AE , A〉}k′E ),
(λ{〈y0, z, x0〉}kA . assert(y0 = kAE ); assert(x0 = E); {z}kE ,
λ{〈y0, z, x0〉}k′A . assert(y0 = k
′
AE ); assert(x0 = E); {z}k′E ),
(〈kAE , A〉, 〈k′AE , A〉),
(kAE , k
′
AE ),
— corresponding components from principal B at Step 3, communicating with E
(〈{〈w, kB , B〉}kA , λ{z0}kB . assert(z0 = kB); {i}kB 〉,
〈{〈w′, k′B , B〉}k′A , λ{z0}k′B . assert(z0 = k
′
B); { j}k′B 〉),
({〈w, kB , B〉}kA , {〈w′, k′B , B〉}k′A ),
(λ{z0}kB . assert(z0 = kB); {i}kB ,
λ{z0}k′B . assert(z0 = k
′
B); { j}k′B )),
— corresponding components from principal A at Step 4, communicating with E
({w}kE , {w′}k′E )}
Fig. 3. Bisimulation for the Needham–Schroeder–Lowe protocol.
Lemma 5.1 (Monotonicity). Take any bisimulation X. For any (s, s′,R) ∈ X and (t, t ′,S) ∈ X with R ⊆ S, if (s)
v XR (s′) v′, then (t) v XS (t ′) v′.
Proof. It follows immediately, from the definitions of (s) v XR (s′) v′ and (t) v XS (t ′) v′. 
Lemma 5.2 (Addition of Fresh Seals). Take any bisimulation X and (s, s′,R) ∈ X. Then, X∪{(sunionmulti{k}, s′unionmulti{k′},Runionmulti
{(k, k′)})} is a bisimulation for any k 6∈ s and k′ 6∈ s′.
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Proof. Straightforward, by checking the conditions of bisimulation. 
We want to show that the bisimilarity ∼ coincides with the contextual equivalence ≡. Since we defined ∼ by
co-induction, the easy direction is showing that contextual equivalence implies bisimilarity.
Lemma 5.3 (Completeness of Bisimilarity). ≡ ⊆ ∼.
Proof. Since ∼ is the greatest bisimulation, it suffices to check that ≡ is a bisimulation. Condition 1 is immediate,
since it is the same as Condition (1) in the definition of contextual equivalence. Condition 2 follows by considering
contexts which destruct v and v′, i.e., a context applying them as functions, a context projecting them as tuples, etc.
Condition 3 follows by considering a context like if [ ] = c then () else⊥. Condition 4 follows from Lemma 3.4(2).
Condition 5 follows by considering a context like let {x}y = {()}z in x else ⊥, setting y = k1 and z = k2 on the
left-hand side, and y = k′1 and z = k′2 on the right-hand side. Condition 6 follows by considering contexts of the form
let {x}y = z in e – setting y = k and z = {v}k on the left-hand side, and y = k′ and z = {v′}k′ on the right-hand-side
– and by Lemma 3.4(4). Condition 7 follows by Lemma 3.4(1) together with Lemma 3.4(3) to add the fresh seals k
and k
′
, Lemma 3.5 to make the arguments v and v′, and Lemma 3.6 to remove them after the applications. 
Next, we need to prove soundness, i.e., that bisimilarity implies contextual equivalence. For this purpose, we define
the following relation.
Definition 5.4 (Bisimilarity in Context). We define ∼= as
{(s, s′,R, [v/x]e0, [v′/x]e0) | (s) v ∼R (s′) v′ ∧ Seals(e0) = ∅}
where (s) v ∼R (s′) v′ is a shorthand for (s) v1 ∼R (s′) v′1 ∧ · · · ∧ (s) vn ∼R (s′) v′n .
We write (s) e ∼=R (s′) e′ for (s, s′,R, e, e′) ∈ ∼=. The intuition behind this definition is: ∼= relates bisimilar values v
and v′ put in context e0.
The two lemmas below are the key properties of our bisimulation. The first states that evaluation preserves ∼=,
the second that ∼= implies observational equivalence (i.e., if the evaluation of one expression converges, then the
evaluation of the other expression also converges).
Lemma 5.5 (Fundamental Property, Part I). Suppose (s0) e ∼=R0 (s′0) e′. If (s0) e ⇓ (t) w and (s′0) e′ ⇓ (t ′) w′, then
(t) w ∼=R (t ′) w′ for someR ⊇ R0.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of (s0) e ⇓ (t) w.
By the definition of ∼=, we have e = [v0/x0]e0 and e′ = [v′0/x0]e0 for some (s0) v0 ∼R0 (s′0) v′0 with
Seals(e0) = ∅. If e is a value, then e′ is also a value (easy case analysis on the syntax of e0) and the result is
immediate, because every value evaluates only to itself. We consider the remaining possibilities in detail, assuming
that e0 is neither a value nor a variable; there is one case for each of the non-value evaluation rules.
Case (E-Tuple), (E-Do-Seal). Straightforward induction.
Case (E-Proj). Straightforward induction, using Condition 4 of the definition of bisimulation.
Case (E-Prim), (E-Cond-True) and (E-Cond-False). Straightforward induction, using Condition 3 of the definition of
bisimulation.
Case (E-New). Straightforward induction, using Lemma 5.2.
Case (E-App). Then e0 has the form e1e2, and the final step in the derivation of (s0) e ⇓ (t) w has the following form:
(s0) [v0/x0]e1 ⇓ (s1) w1 (s1) [v0/x0]e2 ⇓ (s2) w2 . . .
(s0) [v0/x0](e1e2) ⇓ (t) w
The third premise is elided; we will come back to it in a minute. Since (E-App) is the only rule for evaluating an
application, the final step in the derivation of (s′0) e′ ⇓ (t ′) w′ has a similar form:
(s′0) [v′0/x0]e1 ⇓ (s′1) w′1 (s′1) [v′0/x0]e2 ⇓ (s′2) w′2 . . .
(s′0) [v′0/x0](e1e2) ⇓ (t ′) w′
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By the definition of ∼=, we have (s0) [v0/x0]e1 ∼=R0 (s′0) [v′0/x0]e1. Thus, by the induction hypothesis on the
subderivations for [v0/x0]e1 and [v′0/x0]e1, we obtain (s1) w1 ∼=R1 (s′1) w′1 for some R1 ⊇ R0. By the definition
of ∼=, we have w1 = [v1/x1]e3 and w′1 = [v′1/x1]e3 for some (s1) v1 ∼R1 (s′1) v′1 with Seals(e3) = ∅. Since (s0)
v0 ∼R0 (s′0) v′0 andR0 ⊆ R1, we have (s1) v0 ∼R1 (s′1) v′0 by Lemma 5.1.
Applying the definition of ∼= again, we have (s1) [v0/x0]e2 ∼=R1 (s′1) [v′0/x0]e2. So we may apply the induction
hypothesis to the subderivations for [v0/x0]e2 and [v′0/x0]e2, obtaining (s2) w2 ∼=R2 (s′2) w′2 for some R2 ⊇ R1. By
the definition of ∼=, we have w2 = [v2/x2]e4 and w′2 = [v′2/x2]e4 for some (s2) v2 ∼R2 (s′2) v′2 with Seals(e4) = ∅.
Since (s1) v1 ∼R1 (s′1) v′1 andR1 ⊆ R2, we have (s2) v1 ∼R2 (s′2) v′1 by Lemma 5.1.
Now we need to deal with the third premises. Since w1 = [v1/x1]e3 and w′1 = [v′1/x1]e3 must both be functions,
e3 itself must be either a function or a variable; we consider these cases in turn.
Sub-case e3 = λy. e5. Then the final steps in the evaluation derivations for e and e′ are:
(s0) [v0/x0]e1 ⇓ (s1) [v1/x1](λy. e5)
(s1) [v0/x0]e2 ⇓ (s2) [v2/x2]e4
(s2) [v1, v2/x1, x2][e4/y]e5 ⇓ (t) w
(s0) [v0/x0](e1e2) ⇓ (t) w
(s′0) [v′0/x0]e1 ⇓ (s′1) [v′1/x1](λy. e5)
(s′1) [v′0/x0]e2 ⇓ (s′2) [v′2/x2]e4
(s′2) [v′1, v′2/x1, x2][e4/y]e5 ⇓ (t ′) w′
(s′0) [v′0/x0](e1e2) ⇓ (t ′) w′
Since (s2) v1, v2 ∼R2 (s′2) v′1, v′2 and Seals(e4) = Seals(e5) = ∅, we have (s2) [v1, v2/x1, x2][e4/y]e5 ∼=R2 (s′2)[v′1, v′2/x1, x2][e4/y]e5 by the definition of ∼=. So we may apply the induction hypothesis a third time, yielding (t)
w ∼=R (t ′) w′ for someR ⊇ R2 ⊇ R1 ⊇ R0, as required.
Sub-case e3 = x0i , with v1i = λy. e5 and v′1i = λy. e′5 . Then the evaluation derivations for e and e′ are:
(s0) [v0/x0]e1 ⇓ (s1) λy. e5
(s1) [v0/x0]e2 ⇓ (s2) [v2/x2]e4
(s2) [[v2/x2]e4/y]e5 ⇓ (t) w
(s0) [v0/x0](e1e2) ⇓ (t) w
(s′0) [v′0/x0]e1 ⇓ (s′1) λy. e′5
(s′1) [v′0/x0]e2 ⇓ (s′2) [v′2/x2]e4
(s′2) [[v′2/x2]e4/y]e5 ⇓ (t ′) w′
(s′0) [v′0/x0](e1e2) ⇓ (t ′) w′
Since (s2) [[v2/x2]e4/y]e5 ⇓ (t) w and (s′2) [[v′2/x2]e4/y]e5 ⇓ (t ′) w′, we have (s2) (λy. e5)[v2/x2]e4 ⇓ (t) w and
(s2) (λy. e′5)[v′2/x2]e4 ⇓ (t ′) w′ by (E-App). Then, since (s2) λy. e5 ∼R2 (s′2) λy. e′5 and (s2) v2 ∼R2 (s′2) v′2 and
since Seals(e4) = ∅, we have (t, t ′,R2∪{(w,w′)}) ∈ ∼ by Condition 7 of the definition of bisimulation. Thus, by the
definition of ∼=, we have (t) [w/z]z ∼=R2∪{(w,w′)} (t ′) [w′/z]z. That is, (t) w ∼=R (t ′) w′ for R = R2 ∪ {(w,w′)} ⊇
R2 ⊇ R1 ⊇ R0, as required.
Case (E-Unseal-Succ). Then e0 is of the form let {y}e1 = e2 in e3 else e4 and the given evaluation derivations have
the forms:
(s0) [v0/x0]e1 ⇓ (s1) w1 (s1) [v0/x0]e2 ⇓ (s2) w2 . . .
(s0) [v0/x0](let {y}e1 = e2 in e3 else e4) ⇓ (t) w
(s′0) [v′0/x0]e1 ⇓ (s′1) w′1 (s′1) [v′0/x0]e2 ⇓ (s′2) w′2 . . .
(s′0) [v′0/x0](let {y}e1 = e2 in e3 else e4) ⇓ (t ′) w′
By the definition of ∼=, we have (s0) [v0/x0]e1 ∼=R0 (s′0) [v′0/x0]e1. Thus, by the induction hypothesis, we have (s1)
w1 ∼=R1 (s′1) w′1 for some R1 ⊇ R0. Then, by the definition of ∼=, we have w1 = [v1/x1]e5 and w′1 = [v′1/x1]e5 for
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some (s1) v1 ∼R1 (s′1) v′1 and Seals(e5) = ∅. Since (s0) v0 ∼R0 (s′0) v′0 and R0 ⊆ R1, we have (s1) v0 ∼R1 (s′1) v′0
by Lemma 5.1.
Now, again by the definition of ∼=, we have (s1) [v0/x0]e2 ∼=R1 (s′1) [v′0/x0]e2. Thus, by the induction hypothesis,
we have (s2) w2 ∼=R2 (s′2) w′2 for some R2 ⊇ R1. Then, by the definition of ∼=, we have w2 = [v2/x2]e6 and
w′2 = [v′2/x2]e6 for some (s2) v2 ∼R2 (s′2) v′2 and Seals(e6) = ∅. Since (s1) v0 ∼R1 (s′1) v′0 and R1 ⊆ R2, we have
(s2) v0 ∼R2 (s′2) v′0 by Lemma 5.1. Furthermore, since (s1) v1 ∼R1 (s′1) v′1 and R1 ⊆ R2, we have (s2) v1 ∼R2 (s′2)
v′1 by Lemma 5.1.
Since w1 = [v1/x1]e5 and w′1 = [v′1/x1]e5 must be seals while w2 = [v2/x2]e6 and w′2 = [v′2/x2]e6 must be
values sealed under these seals, there are two possible forms for e5 and e6.
Sub-case e5 = x1i and e6 = {e7}x2 j . The evaluation derivation for e is
(s0) [v0/x0]e1 ⇓ (s1) v1i
(s1) [v0/x0]e2 ⇓ (s2) {[v2/x2]e7}v2 j
(s2) [v0, v2/x0, x2][e7/y]e3 ⇓ (t) w
(s0) [v0/x0](let {y}e1 = e2 in e3 else e4) ⇓ (t) w
where v1i = v2 j . Since (s2) v1i ∼R2 (s′2) v′1i and (s2) v2 j ∼R2 (s′2) v′2 j , we have v′1i = v′2 j by Condition 5 of
bisimulation. Then, the evaluation derivation for e′ is:
(s′0) [v′0/x0]e1 ⇓ (s′1) v′1i
(s′1) [v′0/x0]e2 ⇓ (s′2) {[v′2/x2]e7}v′2 j
(s′2) [v′0, v′2/x0, x2][e7/y]e3 ⇓ (t ′) w′
(s′0) [v′0/x0](let {y}e1 = e2 in e3 else e4) ⇓ (t ′) w′
Since (s2) v0, v2 ∼R2 (s′2) v′0, v′2 and Seals(e3) = Seals(e7) = ∅, we have (s2) [v0, v2/x0, x2][e7/y]e3 ∼=R2 (s′2)[v′0, v′2/x0, x2][e7/y]e3 by the definition of ∼=. Then, by the induction hypothesis, we have (t) w ∼=R (t ′) w′ for some
R ⊇ R2 ⊇ R1 ⊇ R0.
Sub-case e5 = x1i and e6 = x2 j . The evaluation derivation for e is
(s0) [v0/x0]e1 ⇓ (s1) v1i (s1) [v0/x0]e2 ⇓ (s2) v2 j
(s2) [v0, v/x0, y]e3 ⇓ (t) w
(s0) [v0/x0](let {y}e1 = e2 in e3 else e4) ⇓ (t) w
where v2 j = {v}v1i for some v. Since (s2) v1i ∼R2 (s′2) v′1i and (s2) v2 j ∼R2 (s′2) v′2 j , we have v′2 j = {v′}k′ for some
(s2) v ∼R2 (s′2) v′ and (s2) v1i ∼R2 (s′2) k′ by Condition 6 of bisimulation. Furthermore, since (s2) v1i ∼R2 (s′2) k′
and (s2) v1i ∼R2 (s′2) v′1i , we have k′ = v′1i by Condition 5 of bisimulation. Then, the evaluation derivation for e′ is:
(s′0) [v′0/x0]e1 ⇓ (s′1) v′1i (s′1) [v′0/x0]e2 ⇓ (s′2) v′2 j
(s′2) [v′0, v′/x0, y]e3 ⇓ (t ′) w′
(s′0) [v′0/x0](let {y}e1 = e2 in e3 else e4) ⇓ (t ′) w′
Since (s2) v0, v ∼R2 (s′2) v′0, v′ and Seals(e3) = ∅, we have (s2) [v0, v/x0, y]e3 ∼=R2 (s′2) [v′0, v′/x0, y]e3 by the
definition of ∼=. Then, by the induction hypothesis, we have (t) w ∼=R (t ′) w′ for someR ⊇ R2 ⊇ R1 ⊇ R0.
Case (E-Unseal-Fail). Similar to the case of (E-Unseal-Succ). 
Lemma 5.6 (Fundamental Property, Part II). If (s0) e ∼=R0 (s′0) e′, then (s0) e ⇓ ⇐⇒ (s′0) e′ ⇓.
Proof. We assume (s0) e ⇓ (t) w and prove (s′0) e′ ⇓ by induction on the derivation of (s0) e ⇓ (t) w. The other
direction follows by symmetry.
The argument is very similar to the proof of Lemma 5.5, except that we are proving the existence of an evaluation
derivation for e′ by using the given evaluation derivation for e, instead of proving a property of given evaluation
derivations for e and e′. We show just the most interesting case: the one for (E-Unseal-Succ).
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By the definition of∼=, we have e = [v0/x0]e0 and e′ = [v′0/x0]e0 for some (s0) v0 ∼R0 (s′0) v′0 and Seals(e0) = ∅.
In the case of (E-Unseal-Succ), e0 is of the form let {y}e1 = e2 in e3 else e4 and the evaluation derivation for e has
the following form:
(s0) [v0/x0]e1 ⇓ (s1) w1 (s1) [v0/x0]e2 ⇓ (s2) w2 . . .
(s0) [v0/x0](let {y}e1 = e2 in e3 else e4) ⇓ (t) w
We aim to derive an evaluation of e′ of a similar form:
(s′0) [v′0/x0]e1 ⇓ (s′1) w′1 (s′1) [v′0/x0]e2 ⇓ (s′2) w′2 . . .
(s′0) [v′0/x0](let {y}e1 = e2 in e3 else e4) ⇓ (t ′) w′
By the definition of∼=, we have (s0) [v0/x0]e1 ∼=R0 (s′0) [v′0/x0]e1. Since (s0) [v0/x0]e1 ⇓, we have (s′0) [v′0/x0]e1 ⇓
(s′1) w′1 for some s′1 and w′1 by the induction hypothesis. Furthermore, by Lemma 5.5, we have (s1) w1 ∼=R1 (s′1)
w′1 for some R1 ⊇ R0. Then, by the definition of ∼=, we have w1 = [v1/x1]e5 and w′1 = [v′1/x1]e5 for some (s1)
v1 ∼R1 (s′1) v′1 and Seals(e5) = ∅. Since (s0) v0 ∼R0 (s′0) v′0 and R0 ⊆ R1, we have (s1) v0 ∼R1 (s′1) v′0 by
Lemma 5.1.
Now, again by the definition of ∼=, we have (s1) [v0/x0]e2 ∼=R1 (s′1) [v′0/x0]e2. Since (s1) [v0/x0]e2 ⇓, we have
(s′1) [v′0/x0]e2 ⇓ (s′2) w′2 for some s′2 and w′2 by the induction hypothesis. Furthermore, by Lemma 5.5, we have (s2)
w2 ∼=R2 (s′2) w′2 for some R2 ⊇ R1. Then, by the definition of ∼=, we have w2 = [v2/x2]e6 and w′2 = [v′2/x2]e6 for
some (s2) v2 ∼R2 (s′2) v′2 and Seals(e6) = ∅. Since (s1) v0 ∼R1 (s′1) v′0 and R1 ⊆ R2, we have (s2) v0 ∼R2 (s′2) v′0
by Lemma 5.1. Furthermore, since (s1) v1 ∼R1 (s′1) v′1 andR1 ⊆ R2, we have (s2) v1 ∼R2 (s′2) v′1 by Lemma 5.1.
Since w1 = [v1/x1]e5 must be a seal while w2 = [v2/x2]e6 must be a value sealed under this seal, there are two
possible forms for e5 and e6.
Sub-case e5 = x1i and e6 = {e7}x2 j . The evaluation derivation for e is
(s0) [v0/x0]e1 ⇓ (s1) v1i
(s1) [v0/x0]e2 ⇓ (s2) {[v2/x2]e7}v2 j
(s2) [v0, v2/x0, x2][e7/y]e3 ⇓ (t) w
(s0) [v0/x0](let {y}e1 = e2 in e3 else e4) ⇓ (t) w
where v1i = v2 j . Since (s2) v1i ∼R2 (s′2) v′1i and (s2) v2 j ∼R2 (s′2) v′2 j , where v1i and v2 j are seals, v′1i and v′2 j are
also seals by Condition 2 of bisimulation. Furthermore, v′1i = v′2 j by Condition 5 of bisimulation.
Meanwhile, since (s2) v0, v2 ∼R2 (s′2) v′0, v′2 and Seals(e3) = Seals(e7) = ∅, we have (s2) [v0, v2/x0, x2][e7/y]e3 ∼=R2 (s′2) [v′0, v′2/x0, x2][e7/y]e3 by the definition of ∼=. Then, since (s2) [v0, v2/x0, x2][e7/y]e3 ⇓, we
have (s′2) [v′0, v′2/x0, x2][e7/y]e3 ⇓ (t ′) w′ for some t ′ and w′ by the induction hypothesis.
Therefore, since v′1i = v′2 j , we can derive an evaluation of e′ as follows:
(s′0) [v′0/x0]e1 ⇓ (s′1) v′1i
(s′1) [v′0/x0]e2 ⇓ (s′2) {[v′2/x2]e7}v′2 j
(s′2) [v′0, v′2/x0, x2][e7/y]e3 ⇓ (t ′) w′
(s′0) [v′0/x0](let {y}e1 = e2 in e3 else e4) ⇓ (t ′) w′
Sub-case e5 = x1i and e6 = x2 j . The evaluation derivation for e is
(s0) [v0/x0]e1 ⇓ (s1) v1i (s1) [v0/x0]e2 ⇓ (s2) v2 j
(s2) [v0, v/x0, y]e3 ⇓ (t) w
(s0) [v0/x0](let {y}e1 = e2 in e3 else e4) ⇓ (t) w
where v2 j = {v}v1i for some v. Since (s2) v1i ∼R2 (s′2) v′1i and (s2) v2 j ∼R2 (s′2) v′2 j where v1i is a seal and v2 j is
a sealed value, v′1i is also a seal and v
′
2 j is also a sealed value by Condition 2 of bisimulation. Furthermore, we have
v′2 j = {v′}k′ for some (s2) v ∼R2 (s′2) v′ and (s2) v1i ∼R2 (s′2) k′ by Condition 6 of bisimulation. Moreover, since
(s2) v1i ∼R2 (s′2) k′ and (s2) v1i ∼R2 (s′2) v′1i , we have k′ = v′1i by Condition 5 of bisimulation.
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Meanwhile, since (s2) v0, v ∼R2 (s′2) v′0, v′ and Seals(e3) = ∅, we have (s2) [v0, v/x0, y]e3 ∼=R2 (s′2)[v′0, v′/x0, y]e3 by the definition of ∼=. Then, since (s2) [v0, v/x0, y]e3 ⇓, we have (s′2) [v′0, v′/x0, y]e3 ⇓ (t ′) w′
for some t ′ and w′ by the induction hypothesis.
Therefore, since v′2 j = {v′}v′1i , we can derive an evaluation of e′
(s′0) [v′0/x0]e1 ⇓ (s′1) v′1i (s′1) [v′0/x0]e2 ⇓ (s′2) v′2 j
(s′2) [v′0, v′/x0, y]e3 ⇓ (t ′) w′
(s′0) [v′0/x0](let {y}e1 = e2 in e3 else e4) ⇓ (t ′) w′
as required. 
An immediate consequence of the previous property is that bisimulation implies contextual equivalence.
Corollary 5.7 (Soundness of Bisimilarity). ∼ ⊆ ≡.
Proof. Suppose (s, s′,R) ∈ ∼, and we shall prove (s, s′,R) ∈ ≡. The first condition of contextual equivalence is
immediate, since it is the same as the first condition of bisimulation. The second condition of contextual equivalence
is proved as follows. Take any (v, v′) ∈ R and any e with Seals(e) = ∅. By definition, (s) [v/x]e ∼=R (s′) [v′/x]e.
Thus, by Lemma 5.6, (s) [v/x]e ⇓ ⇐⇒ (s′) [v′/x]e ⇓. 
Combining soundness and completeness, we obtain the main theorem about our bisimulation: that bisimilarity
coincides with contextual equivalence.
Theorem 5.8. ∼ = ≡.
Proof. By Lemma 5.3 and Corollary 5.7. 
6. Extension with equality for sealed values
A number of variants of λseal can be considered. For example, the version of λseal in this paper does not allow
a context to test two sealed values for equality. This is reasonable if the environment is a safe runtime system (where
sealing can be implemented just by tagging), which disallows comparison of sealed values. It is unrealistic, however,
to expect such a restriction in an arbitrary (perhaps hostile) environment, where sealing must be implemented by
encryption. Fortunately, our technique extends directly to such a modest change as adding equality for sealed values.
For instance, it is straightforward to extend λseal with syntactic equality =1 for first-order values (including sealed
values) along with an additional condition of bisimulation: v1 =1 v2 ⇐⇒ v′1 =1 v′2 for every (v1, v′1) ∈ R and
(v2, v
′
2) ∈ R. Then, it is also straightforward to prove the soundness and completeness of bisimilarity under this
extension, with an additional lemma that∼= respects=1 (which can be proved by induction on the syntax of the values
being compared).
Of course, the more observations we allow, the more difficult it becomes to establish the equivalence of two given
modules. For example, the two implementations of complex numbers given in the introduction are no longer equivalent
(or bisimilar) under the extension above, because there are many polar representations of 0 + 0i , while there is only
one Cartesian representation. So, for example, a context like
C[ ] = let x = [ ].from_re_and_im(0.0, 0.0) in
let y = [ ].from_re_and_im(-1.0, 0.0) in
x =1 [ ].multiply x y
would distinguish CartesianComplex and PolarComplex. To recover the equivalence, the polar representation of
0+ 0i must be standardized, and checks inserted wherever it can be created:
let from_re_and_im =
fun (x, y) ->
let z =
if x = 0.0 && y = 0.0 then (0.0, 0.0) else
(sqrt(x * x + y * y), atan2(y, x)) in
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<seal z under k>
let multiply =
fun (z1, z2) ->
let (r1, t1) = <unseal z1 under k> in
let (r2, t2) = <unseal z2 under k> in
let z =
if r1 = 0.0 || r2 = 0.0 then (0.0, 0.0) else
(r1 * r2, t1 + t2) in
<seal z under k>
7. Related work
As discussed in the introduction, sealing was first proposed by Morris [20,21], and has been revisited in more
recent work on extending the “scope” (in both informal and technical senses) of type abstraction in various forms [7,
12,28,30].
Bisimulations have been studied extensively in process calculi. In particular, bisimulations for the spi-calculus [1,
2,5,6] are the most relevant to this work, because the perfect encryption in the spi-calculus is very similar to dynamic
sealing in our calculus. Our bisimulation is analogous to bisimulations for the spi-calculus in that both keep track of
the environment’s knowledge.
However, since processes and messages are different entities in the spi-calculus, all the technicalities – i.e.,
definitions and proofs – must be developed separately for processes and messages. By contrast, our bisimulation
is monolithic and more straightforward. In particular, the condition of our bisimulation for functions (Condition 7
in Definition 4.1) is simpler than conditions of bisimulations in the spi-calculus for the case of input, where the
received messages are defined by another large set of separate rules and/or not as restricted as function arguments in
Condition 7, leading to more complex bisimulations.
Furthermore, it is possible even to encode and verify some (though not all) security protocols in our framework. The
encoding naturally models the concurrency among principals and attackers (including so-called “necessarily parallel”
attacks) by means of interleaving. Thanks to higher-order functions, we can also simulate asymmetric encryption
and can thereby express public-key protocols such as Needham–Schroeder–Lowe (unlike the spi-calculus) without
extending the calculus. See our previous work [32] for further discussion about this encoding of security protocols.
While our bisimulation is complete with respect to contextual equivalence, no completeness proof is available for
bisimulations in the spi-calculus : the original [2] is known to be incomplete; others [5,6] are proved to be complete
only for some subset of processes (called structurally image-finite processes) despite the claim of completeness for
one of them [6]; the proof of (soundness and) completeness for bisimilarity in applied pi -calculus [1, Theorem 1] has
not been written down in a form accessible to others [personal communication, August 2004].
Another line of work on bisimulations in process calculi concerns techniques for lightening the burden of
constructing a bisimulation—e.g., Milner and Sangiorgi’s “bisimulation up to” [29]. It remains to be seen whether
these techniques would be useful in our setting. Note that our operational semantics is built upon big-step evaluation
(as opposed to small-step reduction) in the first place, which cuts down the intermediate terms and reduces the size of
a bisimulation.
Abramsky [4] studied applicative bisimulation for the λ-calculus. For functions λx . e and λx . e′ to be bisimilar, it
requires that (λx . e)d and (λx . e′)d are observationally equivalent for any closed d, and that they evaluate to bisimilar
values if the evaluations converge. Thus, it requires the two arguments to be the same, which actually makes the
soundness proof harder [9]. We avoided this problem by allowing some difference between the arguments of functions
in our bisimulation.
Jeffrey and Rathke [10] defined bisimulation for the λ-calculus with name generation, of which our seal generation
is an instance. Although their theory does distinguish private and public names, it lacks a proper mechanism to
keep track of contexts’ knowledge of name-involving values in general, such as functions containing names inside
the bodies. As a result, they had to introduce additional language constructs – such as global references [10] or
communication channels [11] – for the bisimulation to be sound. We solved this problem by using a set of relations
(rather than a single relation) between values as a bisimulation, i.e., by considering multiple pairs of values at once.
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E+ρ (x, bool) = x
E+ρ (x, τ1 × . . .× τn) = let 〈y1, . . . , yn〉 = x in
〈E+ρ (y1, τ1), . . . , E+ρ (yn, τn)〉
E+ρ (x, τ → σ) = λy. let z = xE−ρ (y, τ ) in E+ρ (z, σ )
E+ρ (x,∀α. τ) = λy. let z = x() in E+ρ (z, τ )
E+ρ (x, ∃α. τ) = νz. E+ρ,α 7→z(x, τ )
E+ρ (x, α) = {x}ρ(α)
E+ρ (x, α) = x if α 6∈ Dom(ρ)
E−ρ (x, bool) = if x then true else false
E−ρ (x, τ1 × . . .× τn) = let 〈y1, . . . , yn〉 = x in
〈E−ρ (y1, τ1), . . . , E−ρ (yn, τn)〉
E−ρ (x, τ → σ) = λy. let z = xE+ρ (y, τ ) in E−ρ (z, σ )
E−ρ (x,∀α. τ) = λy. νz. E−ρ,α 7→z(x, τ )
E−ρ (x, ∃α. τ) = E−ρ (x, τ )
E−ρ (x, α) = let {y}ρ(α) = x in y else ⊥
E−ρ (x, α) = x if α 6∈ Dom(ρ)
Fig. 4. Translation of type abstraction into dynamic sealing.
A well-known method of proving the abstraction obtained by type abstraction is logical relations [17,27]. Although
they are traditionally defined on denotational models, they have recently been studied in the syntactic setting of term
models as well [24,25]. In previous work [32], we have defined syntactic logical relations for perfect encryption and
used them to prove secrecy properties of security protocols. Although logical relations are analogous to bisimulations
in that both relate corresponding values between two different programs, logical relations are defined by induction on
types and cannot be applied in untyped settings. Moreover, logical relations in more sophisticated settings (such as
recursive functions and recursive types) than the simply typed λ-calculus tend to become rather complicated. Indeed,
“keys encrypting keys” (as in security protocols) required non-trivial extensions to the logical relations above, while
they imposed no difficulty to our bisimulation in this paper.
8. Conclusions
We have defined a bisimulation for λseal and proved its soundness and completeness with respect to contextual
equivalence.
There are several directions for future work. One is to apply our bisimulation to more examples, e.g., to prove
the full abstraction of our translation of type abstraction into dynamic sealing—indeed, this was actually the original
motivation for the present work. When the target language is untyped, the translation of the source term ` M : τ
can be given as let x = erase(M) in E+∅ (x, τ ), where E+ is defined like Fig. 4 along with its dual E− in a type-
directed manner. Intuitively, E+ is a “firewall” that protects terms from contexts, where E− is a “sandbox” that protects
contexts from terms. Bisimulation would help in proving properties of this translation. We may also be able to use
such an interpretation of type abstraction by dynamic sealing as a (both formal and informal) basis for reasoning about
type abstraction in broader settings.
Another possibility is to define and use bisimulation for other forms of information hiding, such as type abstraction.
Our treatment of seals are analogous to the treatment of generative names in general [26,31], of which abstract types
are an instance as soon as they escape from their scope (by communication [30], for example). Thus, it would be
possible to define bisimulation for type abstraction in a similar manner to our definition of bisimulation for dynamic
sealing. This is interesting because such bisimulation may be complete with respect to contextual equivalence as in
this work, while it is difficult to obtain complete logical relations for type abstraction [24,25]. See our recent work [33]
for further discussions on this topic.
It would also be interesting to extend our work to more general operations on sealing/encryption, as in the applied
pi-calculus [1]. Recall that the syntax and semantics in Section 2 did not allow any primitive op (or constant c) to
involve seals.
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Mechanical support for bisimulation proofs is of natural interest as well. Full automation is hopeless, since general
cases subsume the halting problem (i.e., whether the evaluation of a λ-expression converges or diverges), but many
of the conditions of bisimulation are easy to check or satisfy by adding elements to the bisimulation. One challenging
point would be the case analysis on function arguments [u/x]d and [u′/x]d in Condition 7, shown in detail in
Example 4.4.
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